Deconstructing the Diaspora: The Construction of Chinese-Indonesian Identity in Post-Suharto Indonesia by Allen, PM
1 
Deconstructing the diaspora: The construction of Chinese-Indonesian identity in post-
Suharto Indonesia 
 
One of the most telling aspects of the polemics surrounding the issue of Chinese identity in 
Indonesia is the very language in which it is embedded. The Chinese, their culture, their religion, 
arguably their very existence in Indonesia, have been branded by colonialists, scholars and 
politicians alike as masalah Cina, ‘the Chinese problem.’ I am not necessarily suggesting that this 
has become a self-fulfilling prophesy, but I would argue that we are shaped, influenced, and to a 
certain extent defined by the labels that others put on us. In the case of the Chinese in Indonesia, it 
certainly seems to be a case of ‘once a masalah, always a masalah.’ Or, to look at it another way, 
as Ignatius Wibowo recently asked—rhetorically, presumably—: ‘At what point does a person’s 
Chinese-ness cease to be?’)1 As I will demonstrate later in this chapter, labelling has played a very 
significant part in the way in which Chinese-Indonesians view and understand themselves and are 
viewed and understood by others. 
Chinese-Indonesians have occupied an ambivalent and at times turbulent position in Indonesia 
since the days of Dutch colonialism. Under their divide-and-rule policy, the Dutch colonial 
government encouraged the Chinese to preserve their own identity, discouraging assimilation. 
After Indonesia gained independence in 1945, indigenous nationalists who had hitherto been 
preoccupied with overseeing the end of colonialism, began to turn their attention to the Chinese as 
‘Other’. The project of Indonesian nation-building thus generated a pribumi (native) versus non-
pribumi ethnic tension which has been a constant feature of identity politics in post-colonial 
Indonesia.  
The so-called masalah Cina has been the subject of a number of scholarly works.1 The Chinese 
have been subjected to othering in Indonesia on account of their cultural and religious difference, 
on account of their dominance in the nation’s economy and (paradoxically, as this seems to 
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contradict that economic dominance) on account of their purported complicity with Communism. 
Scholarly analysis of issues confronting the Chinese minority in post-colonial Indonesia has 
focused upon the nexus between ethnicity, nationality and identity and the ways in which the 
Chinese ‘difference’ is seen to problematise notions of a coherent nation-building project in 
Indonesia. 
After assuming the Indonesian presidency in 1966, following the attempted putsch (officially 
constructed an ‘abortive Communist coup’) which led to the fall of his predecessor Sukarno, 
President Suharto issued a decree which forbade any activities pertaining to Chinese religion or 
culture. Chinese schools and organisations were banned. Chinese personal and business names 
were forbidden. The use of Chinese script was banned, except for the dual-text newspaper Harian 
Indonesia, which was permitted under strict licence and government scrutiny to publish news in 
both Indonesian and Mandarin. The aggressive witch-hunt and victimisation of Chinese-
Indonesians following the attempted 1965 coup, justified on the grounds of their alleged complicity 
with Communism, transformed itself into an insidious silencing, intimidation and discrediting of 
Chinese throughout Suharto’s New Order regime. The vulnerability of the Chinese in political 
terms was exploited by New Order officials, who permitted Chinese involvement in business while 
taking a generous percentage of the profits for themselves. 
Unlike the anti-integrationist policy of the Dutch colonial government, the official government 
response to the masalah Cina in the New Order was an assimilation programme, the Program 
Pembauran, which was predicated upon the idea that Chinese ethnicity was incompatible with the 
‘national personality,’2 and that erasure was therefore the only viable solution. Under this 
programme intermarriage and conversion to Islam were actively encouraged. 
In the early 1990s there were signs of a softening in attitude, at least at the official level, 
towards Chinese-Indonesians. This coincided with the growth in the Indonesian middle class; a 
significant number of successful media figures for example were Chinese. A weekly magazine, 
Sinar, aimed at a Chinese readership (and financially backed by the uncle of President Suharto’s 
wife) appeared on the market in 1993. 
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But these tentative signs of change were insignificant by comparison with the dramatic changes 
wrought upon the lives of Chinese-Indonesians during the upheaval that began in mid-February 
1998 and culminated in the resignation of Suharto in May of that year. This four-month period was 
marked by appalling violence against Chinese and their businesses, and the rape of hundreds of 
Chinese women. Suharto's resignation then led to a space-clearing, which suddenly provided 
opportunities for Chinese-Indonesians to openly discuss their experiences as an oppressed minority. 
This space-clearing was extended on 17 January 2000 when President Wahid officially revoked the 
presidential decree of 1967. Chinese-Indonesians were thus able to celebrate Chinese New Year 
openly for the first time in thirty-three years.  
 
Changes in identity issues since 1998 
Political developments in Indonesia subsequent to the dismantling of President Suharto's 
authoritarian New Order regime have been the focus of great international attention. The dramatic 
economic and political changes of the last four years have been the subject of much analysis. But 
an important issue that has not yet been systematically addressed is the impact of this profound 
social and political change on the way individuals and groups in Indonesia view themselves. One of 
the New Order’s primary concerns had been the development of the ‘ideal’ Indonesian citizen. 
With the dismantling of New Order state structures and ideologies, alternative discourses of 
identity became possible, giving rise to new notions of Indonesian-ness. A significant part of this 
re-negotiation of the self in Indonesia has been the re-emergence of Chinese consciousness.3 After 
January 2000 a plethora of organisations devoted to Chinese cultural and literary activities sprang 
up, along with dual-language publications such as Mandarin Pos and Zhuinan Ribao, the first 
newspaper solely in Mandarin. The violence that was perpetrated against Chinese-Indonesians in 
1998 was in part the inspiration for the establishment of a non-profit organisation known as the 
World Huaren Federation, which developed into an extremely popular on-line discussion forum4 
for overseas Chinese, including Chinese-Indonesians. The sheer volume of postings in 1998 is 
testament to the need felt by Chinese-Indonesians for an outlet for their fears and aspirations. The 
Lembaga Pendidikan Bahasa Tionghoa (Institute for the Teaching of Chinese) in Surabaya now 
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has an interactive website dealing not only with Mandarin, but also with various facets of Chinese 
culture and festivals. Just last month Specify when the Universitas Muhammadiyah in 
Yogyakarta established both a Centre for the Study of Chinese (language) (Pusat latihan bahasa 
Tionghoa) and a Centre for the Study of Sinology (Pusat Studi Sinologi). (It was in fact President 
B.J. Habibie who issued a presidential instruction requiring the authorities to allow the teaching of 
Chinese, in May 1999.) 
Among the numerous political parties that sprang up after the fall of Suharto were a number 
specifically concerned with issues pertaining to the status of Chinese-Indonesians in the reformasi 
era. The diverse nature of these political parties reflected the diversity of views among Chinese-
Indonesians about their appropriate status in late twentieth century Indonesia. Parpindo, Partai 
Pembauran Indonesia (the Indonesian Assimilationist Party), for example, declared its genesis to 
be ‘a reaction to the failure of the assimilation process under Golkar’.2 Other Chinese-oriented 
political parties included Partai Reformasi Tionghoa Indonesia (Parti), Persatuan Saudara Baru 
Indonesia (Persabi) and Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Indonesia (PBI).  
But ‘freedom’ can be something of a double-edged sword. For some, the new opportunities it 
delivers can be frightening and confusing. And the responses to this freedom among Chinese-
Indonesians are by no means homogeneous. In particular, three issues generate a diversity of 
response among Chinese-Indonesians. 
The first is the issue of labelling. Along with his 1967 presidential decree, Suharto introduced 
the term Cina as a replacement for the Indonesian words Tiongkok to refer to China and Tionghoa 
to refer to Chinese. This was intended to emphasise a link between the Chinese and the Indonesian 
Communist Party, which had been blamed officially for the attempted coup against Sukarno in 
1965. There was a general belief that leftist politics had always been supported by a large portion 
of Chinese-Indonesians, and because the People's Republic of China was Communist, ‘Chinese’ 
was essentialised as being the same as ‘Communist’. It is this essentialism which has in part 
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triggered and vindicated the targeting and scapegoating of Chinese-Indonesians at times of political 
and economic crisis in Indonesia. The other element in the equation is the dominant position 
occupied by the Chinese in the nation's economy. The Chinese have thus acquired a paradoxical 
status in Indonesia—economically they are perceived as dominant, but politically and culturally 
they are pariahs. The word Cina thus became a derogatory term. But what should we now be 
calling Chinese-Indonesians? Amongst Chinese-Indonesians themselves there is considerable 
diversity of opinion on the topic. The high-profile academic and political commentator Arief 
Budiman, for example, has declared that it is no longer an issue—Cina has become a value-free 
word and can be used without fear of giving offence (and indeed Chinese-Indonesians born since 
1967 know no other word for ‘Chinese’). Others take issue with Arief and maintain that Tionghoa 
is the only politically-correct term. Some Indonesians even use the English word Chinese because 
they are confused as to what is currently acceptable. At the official level, just two weeks ago 
when? President Megawati formally revoked the use of Cina, reinstating Tiongkok and Tionghoa. 
Allied with this are debates about the nexus between ethnic and national identity. In 2000, for 
example, a lecturer in Mandarin at SOAS in London,: replace with footnote with name and 
personal communication and date?  a Chinese-Indonesian from Jakarta now living in London, 
was adamant that Chinese-Indonesians should forget their Chinese ethnicity in the interests of a 
harmonious and homogeneous Indonesian nation. She was almost proud that her children speak no 
Mandarin at all and can't communicate with their grandmother. There are other Chinese-
Indonesians, some high-profile, such as the film-maker Teguh Karya, for whom ethnicity is simply 
not an issue. Their Chineseness is irrelevant. This denial or effacement of Chinese ethnicity 
represents perhaps one end of the spectrum. At the other end is the response of a prominent 
member of the National Commission on Violence Against Women. When interviewed last year 
when? about the re-emergence of Chinese consciousness, her response was, 'Oh well, all sorts of 
people are coming out of the woodwork now and declaring themselves to be Chinese-Indonesian. 
It's become the trendy thing to do!' 
The third issue is the way in which we speak about cultural products of Chinese-Indonesians. Is 
it still appropriate to use the term Chinese-Indonesian literature, for example, as if it is a type of 
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diasporic literature? Wilson Tjandinegara uses the term Inhoa, indicating the two cultural elements 
in this literature—Indonesia and Tionghoa. When we speak of Indonesian literature, theatre or 
music, is the ‘default setting’ literature written by pribumi Indonesians, meaning that we still need 
to qualify other types of literature with the appropriate epithet? Does the use of the epithet 
illuminate or otherwise?  
 
Cultural expressions of identity 
Since the early twentieth century Indonesian writers and artists have engaged with the project 
of creating and defining Indonesian identity. This was a project that developed out of the nationalist 
movement and the conditions of late colonialism. Literature and art thus became understood as not 
merely products for consumption and entertainment, but rather as a significant part of the 
nationalist movement. Most serious writers and artists engaged with the project of interrogating and 
investigating issues of national identity. In New Order Indonesia various forms of cultural 
activity—literature, theatre, music, the visual arts—continued to operate as sites of both political 
resistance and the negotiation of identity. The best-known Indonesian literary works from the late 
twentieth century—the novels of Pramoedya Ananta Toer and Y.B. Mangunwijaya, the short 
stories of Seno Gumira Ajidarma, the poetry of Rendra, Putu Oka and Wiji Thukul—along with the 
plays of Ratna Sarumpaet and Riantiarno and the music of Iwan Fals dan Franky Sahilatua are all 
the products of socially-engaged writers and artists grappling with issues pertaining to what it 
means to be ‘Indonesian’. 
How then, if at all, are Chinese-Indonesian writers and artists voicing issues pertaining to 
identity and political status through literary, theatrical, musical and other forms of cultural 
expression in the post-Suharto period, now that they are technically ‘free’ to declare their Chinese 
heritage? Like the Chinese-Indonesians themselves, the nature of this cultural production is diverse. 
Some cultural activities are largely decorative, symbolic and not overtly politically or socially 
engaged. Some—particularly in the visual arts—are gentle, almost tentative explorations of identity 
that are poignant rather than confronting. In literature, there are stories that address issues of broad 
social concern—the exploitation of women, oppressive bosses and the evils of Western 
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education—and others that more overtly address issues central to the masalah Cina, in particular 
the possibility and nature of friendship between Chinese-Indonesians and pribumi Indonesians. 
And there are some which are unambiguously inspired by the dreadful events of early 1998. To 
quote the Chinese-Indonesian poet Wilson Tjandinegara, ‘The tragedy of May 1998 rocked the 
world. Most of the victims were of Chinese ethnicity. It was a tragedy that has left a dark stain on 
the history of Indonesia. A poet who has any compassion must condemn those events and convey 
his sympathy to the victims through his poetry...’3 
The most visible Chinese cultural activity since the fall of Suharto has been the Barongsai, the 
Chinese Lion Dance, which effectively came to symbolise the freedom of expression now granted 
the Chinese in Indonesia. After three decades of lying low, ‘the dragon was only sleeping’4, 
declared a Kompas article in February 2000. To commemorate Chinese New Year in January 
which year, the television station RCTI screened the Chinese historical romance film Lo Fen Koei, 
which was shot in Tangerang and Cirebon during the preceding year. The daily national newspaper 
Kompas printed a half-page pictorial display of Imlek (New Year) celebrations, as well as a large 
feature article, as if, to quote the online magazine Mandiri ‘to emphasise that your [Chinese 
citizens’] existence is acknowledged in this chaotic republic of ours.’5 For its part, Mandiri Online 
established Imleknet, a column designed to provide information about Chinese New Year and 
Chinese culture.6 The classic Chinese-Malay novel Boenga Roos dari Tjikembang, first published 
in 1927 (and a favourite of ‘housewives’ to quote the critics), has also been revived: it was 
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reprinted by a Yogyakarta publishing house and performed as a stage play at the time of Chinese 
New Year in Jakarta which year. 
A performance genre with an overt political sentiment is the Chinese puppet performance 
wayang Po Tay Hie which, like most other Chinese cultural performances, was banned by the New 
Order government, but has been revived and presented to appreciative audiences. Founded around 
3,000 years ago in mainland China, wayang Po Tay Hie is believed to have been brought to 
Indonesia by Chinese immigrants in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The performances, 
which are usually in Mandarin or Malay, are based on Chinese mythology and legends, but the 
themes of power, the weak versus the strong and the subversion of truth lend themselves readily to 
more contemporary interpretations.  
Apart from stories that deal overtly with the events of 1998, the masalah Cina is invoked in 
recent fiction through gentle and optimistic—idealistic even—stories about the possibility of 
friendship and understanding between Chinese and pribumi Indonesians, stories in which Chinese-
Indonesians demonstrate a generosity of spirit towards their pribumi friends. This 1998 picture of 
Amien Rais, and the caption accompanying it, seems to tap into that optimistic frame of thinking: 
The declaration and inauguration of the leaders of the Solo branch of PAN on Sunday 
13 November was enlivened by the Barongsai, which has been ‘buried’ for more than 
thirty years. Here we see the lion performing in front of national PAN leader Amien 
Rais, who, prior to the performance had presented the performer with an angpao (red 
envelope). 
 
(The Huaren Federation, however, more cynically suggested that it could be read as ‘a political 
strategy to buy the Chinese minority.’)7 
Since 1998 a number of Chinese-Indonesian visual artists have been exploring identity issues 
through their work. The young installation artist Anna Zuchriana is an example. Anna’s mother is 
of Chinese descent and her father is a Jakarta Malay. Her family is Muslim, but they live in an area 
adjacent to China Town in Jakarta. By her own admission, before May 1998 Anna’s understanding 
of herself as a Chinese-Indonesian had been almost latent, something she hadn't really noticed, but 
in the space of a few minutes, when her house was surrounded by an angry mob of youths, she 
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suddenly realised that the duality within her was an issue, it did matter, and this was the genesis of 
a subsequent exhibition titled Kenapa sih Cina?, ‘Why the Chinese(-ness}’? Her art is not simply, 
or perhaps not at all, a political statement; it is a very personal reflection on the tension and 
ambivalence that informs her sudden confrontation with her ethnicity. One particularly poignant 
piece titled ‘Which one should be covered?’ depicts Chinese women who are not Muslim covering 
their faces with jilbab to avoid attacks.  
Although the terror of the killings, rape and fear of 1998 are made explicit in some recent literary 
production, especially short stories, there is an understated quality about them, a restraint almost. On 
the whole these stories are marked by sadness and pathos; rather than defining the narrative, the 
anger and resentment simmers below the surface. By way of example, (my translations of) two very 
short recent pieces are presented below.5 The first is a 'mini-story' by A. Jiao called Peci, originally 
written in Mandarin. A peci is the black velvet cap worn by Muslim men in Indonesia: 
The wind whipped around our legs. Above us, dark clouds skittered across the 
sky, threatening to engulf our little town. The combination of ubiquitous dust—
legacy of a long dry season—and air pollution made it hard to breathe. I was giving 
Salman a ride on my Vespa through the shopping precinct. The next night his son was 
to be circumcised and he’d asked me to take him shopping. 
I parked the bike and we strapped our helmets to it, then set off towards the 
supermarket. Suddenly another clump of dark clouds appeared in the distance and 
began to approach us. This time it was a mass of people, shouting hysterically as they 
ran towards us. As they got closer the normal confused rabble of voices in the market 
began to recede, and people ran off to hide. In an instant the steel shop doors were 
slammed shut.  
‘A Siong, let’s get out of here!’ In the midst of the chaos Salman was pushing me 
back towards the bike. When I’d got it going, I suddenly felt him behind me, 
jamming his peci, which he wore every day, onto my head. 
The mob swarmed past me, screaming hysterically. I concentrated on keeping 
control of the bike. I could hear Salman praying behind me. It sounded as if he was 
reciting verses from the Koran. 
Eventually we were clear of the commotion and I picked up speed, glancing back 
from time to time. Near where I’d parked the bike I could see a number of vehicles in 
flames. Thick smoke billowed above the supermarket, mingling with the clouds. Yet 
another tragedy! Once again, I ached inside. 
I touched the velvet peci. I was so moved. I’d seen him wearing it every day for 
the last ten years or more, but I’d never really noticed it. Who would have thought 
that one day I’d wear that very same peci and that it would save me from disaster.  
 
The second is an excerpt from a short story titled Mawar by Nano Riantiarno. Mawar means 
rose: 
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There was a little girl called Mawar. She was still in primary school. Not long 
after the tragedy of May 1998 she came home from school and asked her father: 'Dad, 
what's my name?' Naturally her father was thrown by this question, and he said 
nothing for a moment or two. Then he said, 'Your name is Mawar.' But the child was 
insistent, pestering him to tell her what her real name was. Then he realised what was 
behind her question. It transpired that the girl's friends had been nagging her to tell 
them her 'original name' which couldn't possibly be 'Mawar'. Her distinctive 
complexion and her almond-shaped eyes were what had prompted their questioning. 
 
Poets too have invoked 1998 in their recent poetry. Medy Loekito’s poem titled simply ‘14 
May 1998’ reads 
the night has lost its clarity 
i reach for God’s hand 
it isn’t there8  
 
Wilson Tjandinegara’s poem ‘We must not remain silent’ is a poignant plea for recognition as 
a human being, infused with an anger that is palpable yet restrained: 
 
Because we’ve always been patient 
we’ve often been the victims 
the scapegoats 
 
For that reason we must not remain silent! 
 
There must be a limit to our stoicism  
in the face of unfair treatment 
and humiliation 
 
Because we must not remain silent! 
 
We are humans too, we are humans! 
with the same rights 
however downtrodden we may be 
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For that reason we must not remain silent!9  
 
Not only is there a broad spectrum of positioning amongst Chinese-Indonesians in respect of 
their identity, there is also a considerable range of response to this new situation among pribumi 
Indonesians. The best-known champion of Chinese-Indonesians in Indonesia is Pramoedya Ananta 
Toer, who has written a book, Hoakiau di Indonesia, about their contribution to the Indonesian 
nation (a book originally written in the 1960s and banned by Sukarno, then re-released which 
year?). In the arts, in academia and in business Chinese-Indonesians and pribumi work alongside 
each other. However, in many quarters the masalah Cina remains couched in the pribumi versus 
non-pribumi polemics which Ariel Heryanto identifies as a powerful means of othering the 
Chinese. Heryanto has written compellingly of how the ethnic Other is indispensable for the 
reproduction of the native Self. It is an issue which is addressed in a novel by a pribumi Indonesian, 
Putu Wijaya. The novel is called Perang and is a sort of postmodernist rendition of the 
Bharatayudha war in the Mahabharata epic. In it the ogres, the really evil faction of the story, are 
clearly intended to represent the Chinese in contemporary Indonesia. The wise clown-servant 
Semar muses: 
The enemy serves many functions. He is a tool for fine-tuning our minds and 
bodies, so that we are ever-ready, ever-alert and ever-mindful. He trains us to win. He 
hones our thoughts so we don't become neglectful, stagnant or careless. We should 
tend to the enemy in the same way as we tend a garden, so that we are always 
occupied, so that we don't become tired of waiting. Like a garden, the enemy 
provides a focus where we can channel our energies during times of recreation.  
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Since the fall of Suharto, change and uncertainty remain arguably the only ‘constant’ in 
Indonesia. Chinese-Indonesians are experiencing—whether they like it or not—an increased 
visibility in the cultural sphere, but on the whole it remains decorative and symbolic (and the cynic 
may argue, pragmatic), rather than truly transformative. As a category, 'Chinese-Indonesian' 
remains diverse and heterogeneous, as indeed is the ‘native Self’ against which it is repeatedly 
pitted. The masalah Cina has not been ‘solved’; it is just being re-defined. 
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